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Technical Regulations and Standards under the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
Arwel Davies 
Published: [2014] Legal Issues of Economic Integration 41(1), 37-63 
When applying the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), an initial issue is 
whether the challenged instrument should be classified as a technical regulation, or as a standard. 
Under the relevant Treaty language, both instruments can set product characteristics such as 
marking or labelling requirements with the distinction turning on the phrase ‘with which 
compliance is mandatory’. The meaning of this phrase was contested in US-Tuna II, with the 
matter eventually being resolved in Mexico’s favour. A rare panel dissent classified the dolphin-
safe labelling scheme as a voluntary standard based on a clear test leading to definite outcomes. 
However, the panel majority and Appellate Body preferred a more flexible and less predictable 
approach under which the measure was classified as a mandatory technical regulation. This article 
questions whether this is an area in which flexibility plays a useful role, or one in which clarity and 
predictability can be preferred. The article is informed by an obvious consideration which is 
nevertheless almost absent from the case law and academic debate. The classification of the 
measure at issue is important to the extent that the TBT adopts a differentiated approach towards 
technical regulations and standards in terms of the applicable substantive obligations and the 
manner of their enforcement.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This article focuses on the distinction between technical regulations and standards under the WTO 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). The two instruments are defined and distinguished in 
TBT Annex 1.1 The second sentence of both definitions provides the same non-exhaustive list of product 
characteristics which may therefore be either technical regulations or standards. Under the first sentence 
of each definition, it is clear that the distinction depends on the phrase ‘with which compliance is 
                                                          
  a.p.davies@swansea.ac.uk. The author is grateful for the helpful comments provided by Joel Trachtman,, James 
Mathis,  Enrico Partiti and the participants at the International Economic Law Section of the 2013 Society of Legal 
Scholars Conference, Edinburgh.  
1 1. Technical regulation Document which lays down product characteristics or their related processes and 
production methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory. It 
may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements 
as they apply to a product, process or production method. 
2. Standard Document approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, 
guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes and production methods, with which compliance is 
not mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or 
labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or production method. 
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mandatory’. The distinction between the two instruments is conventionally explained on the basis that 
that compliance is mandated when the product characteristic in question must be satisfied in order to 
market the product. Such measures are technical regulations. In contrast, compliance is voluntary, and the 
measure is a standard, when the product can be marketed without satisfying the product characteristic.2 
The second proposition was however rejected in US-Tuna II.3 The US argued here that its 
measure did not mandate compliance and could not be reviewed as a technical regulation. Under this 
measure, importers wishing to use a dolphin safe label had to use the US label, and none other. They had 
to comply with all the strictures of that label subject to stringent enforcement mechanisms specific to and 
embodied in the measure itself. In this sense, the measure incorporated a strong compulsory element. On 
the other hand, tuna could also be marketed without a dolphin safe label. This permissive aspect of the 
scheme motivated a rare dissent within the panel reflecitng the conventional understanding of the 
distinction between the two instruments. As importers retained the option of marketing tuna without 
making any claim about dolphin safety, the labelling requirement did not mandate compliance. In 
contrast, for the panel majority and the Appellate Body, the permissive aspect was not dispositive. Their 
alternative approach focused on a number of elements, which can be termed provenance, exclusivity and 
enforceability, with no clear identification of any weighting which was applied to the different elements. 
This was a case by case approach in which adjudicators appear to retain discretion on the significance to 
be attached to the presence of one element, or the absence of another. 
At the time of writing, it is clear that the panel dissent on the issue of mandatory compliance has 
been preferred over the panel majority and Appellate Body approach.4 However, the nature of the 
distinction between technical regulations and standards has not been subject to a sustained critique. This 
article is intended to fill this gap and proceeds as follows.  
The most obvious question is surprisingly one which has not been addressed in the case law. 
Why, if at all, does it matter whether the instrument is a technical regulation or a standard? The US failed 
to establish that its dolphin safe label was a standard. In raising this argument, did it have some advantage 
in mind in terms of the ease with which it could defend the dolphin-safe label if identified as a standard? 
Section 2 explains what is at stake when distinguishing between the two instruments. The issue here is 
whether the obligations which apply to central government technical regulations and standards are 
materially different in terms of their content or manner of enforcement. It is argued that the TBT provides 
for an undifferentiated approach.  
                                                          
2 A. Sykes, Product Standards for Internationally Integrated Goods Markets (The Brookings Institution, 
Washington; 1995) at 2. 
3 Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna 
Products (US –Tuna II), WT/DS381/AB/R, adopted 16 May 2012. 
4 See the following discussion thread, visited on 25 April 2013 
http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2011/09/technical-regulations-vs-standards-in-the-tuna-panel-report.html 
In the published literature, Mavroidis considers that the Appellate Body’s approach to the issue of mandatory 
compliance ‘cannot be right’. Howse and Levy describe the Appellate Body’s approach as ‘very controversial’. P.C. 
Mavroidis, ‘Driftin’ too far from Shore – Why the Test for Compliance with the TBT Agreement Developed by the 
WTO Appellate Body is Wrong, and What Should the AB have done Instead’ 12 World Trade Review (2013) 509 at 
523; R. Howse and P.I. Levy, ‘The TBT Panels: US-Cloves, US-Tuna, US-COOL’ 12 World Trade Review (2013) 
327 at 333. 
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Section 3 shifts the focus from the manner in which the TBT distinguishes between the two 
instruments, towards the considerations which may influence states when deciding whether to regulate via 
mandatory technical regulations or voluntary standards. The choice between the instruments is depicted 
here as depending on entirely legitimate considerations. Against this background, the role of WTO 
tribunals is to check whether the instrument, be it a technical regulation or a standard, has been influenced 
by protectionist motivations. This is achieved by assessing the measure for conformity with the TBT’s 
substantive obligations. As WTO tribunals can engage with these substantive obligations for both 
instruments, the identity of the instrument is not crucial.  
With this key point in mind, the remainder of the article considers the contrasting approaches in 
US-Tuna II towards distinguishing the two instruments. As noted, the panel dissent in this case reflects 
the conventional understanding that mandatory compliance turns on whether the products can be 
marketed without meeting the product characteristic. Section 4 explains the motivation for this approach 
as being a need to avoid a tautology in treaty interpretation between the terms ‘labelling requirements’ 
and ‘with which compliance is mandatory’. Sections 5 and 6 further discuss the characteristics and 
operation of the test for mandatory compliance in the panel dissent. It is clearly advantageous that this test 
enables a tautology to be avoided. However, does this advantage come at the expense of any deficiencies? 
In particular, is the test as clear and simple as it seems in terms of leading to predictable outcomes on 
whether a measure is a technical regulations or a standard? As explored in Section 5, some doubt on this 
question is created by the dissent itself since it seems to distinguish the measure in US-Tuna II from that 
at issue in EC-Sardines.5 Section 5 explains how the measures in these cases did not mandate compliance 
and were therefore not technical regulations upon the proper application of the test in the dissent.  
An interesting observation emerges from the process of establishing that these cases should not be 
distinguished. The test for mandatory compliance in the US-Tuna II dissent operates independently of the 
relationship between the measure and the market place. As it was possible to market tuna without a 
dolphin safe label, the measure did not mandate compliance. This conclusion was not influenced by the 
difficulties in practice of accessing the larger part of the market without the dolphin safe label, as a result 
of the interplay between the preferences of consumers and the business decisions of retailers. The 
relationship between the measure and the market place is a relevant consideration when determining 
whether the TBT’s substantive obligations have been breached. In turn, it can be regarded as an indicator 
of protectionist motivations. The question is then whether it matters that the test in the dissent operates 
independently of this indicator. Put differently, does it matter that the test contains no discretionary 
elements capable of accommodating the impressions of adjudicators on the merits of the claim based on 
                                                          
5 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R, adopted 23 
October 2002. 
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Hudec’s well-known ‘smell test’?6 This could only be regarded as a deficiency of the dissent test if the 
TBT embodied a differentiated approach towards central government instruments. However, as the TBT 
provides for an undifferentiated approach, it is not a matter of concern to classify the instrument as a 
voluntary standard and defer a review of how the standard operates in the market place to the TBT’s 
substantive obligations. 
Section 6 discusses the treatment of de facto mandatory compliance in the US-Tuna II dissent and 
the United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling Requirements (US-COOL)7 panel. Based again 
on the argument that the TBT adopts the undifferentiated approach to central government technical 
regulations and standards noted above, the section defends the narrow interpretation of this concept in the 
dissent. Section 7 considers the Appellate Body’s approach in US-Tuna II towards distinguishing between 
technical regulations and standards. As indicated, the Appellate Body preferred a case by case approach 
based on three criteria. The analysis confirms that these criteria share the same advantage as the dissent of 
enabling a tautology in treaty interpretation to be avoided. Also considered is whether three overlapping 
criteria are required to reveal when a product characteristic mandates compliance, or whether one or other 
of the criteria would suffice. Through these questions, it is possible to express a view on how the 
Appellate Body’s approach towards mandatory compliance will develop in future cases, or what it might 
be reduced to. Section 8 concludes.  
2. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TECHNICAL REGULATIONS / STANDARDS DISTINCTION 
The obligations under which technical regulations can be reviewed are among the most sensitive in the 
WTO agreements. TBT Article 2.1 requires that technical regulations must not discriminate between 
domestic and imported products and between imported products of different origin. This is a relatively 
uncontroversial provision, albeit that it is not clearly accompanied by an exceptions provision similar to 
GATT Article XX. The question is therefore whether regulatory purpose can be considered as part of the 
process of deciding on a possible Article 2.1 infringement, as opposed to under an exceptions provision. 
Article 2.2 requires Members to ‘ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied 
with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade’. Article 2.4 
requires that Members use international standards ‘as a basis for their technical regulations except when 
such international standards … would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfillment of the 
legitimate objectives pursued’. These provisions are described by Horn and Weiler as giving rise to a 
paradigm shift in international economic law ‘from local discretion to an internationally determined 
standard [Article 2.4] and, even more importantly from a regime of non-discrimination to one of non-
                                                          
6 Robert E. Hudec, ‘Science and “Post-Discriminatory” WTO Law’ 26 Boston College International and 
Comparative Law Review (2003) 185 at 193-194; Robert E. Hudec, ‘GATT/WTO Constraints on National 
Regulation: Requiem for an “Aim and Effects” Test’, 32 International Lawyer (1998) 619 at 634. Hudec would 
perhaps have been uncomfortable with an association between his ‘smell test’ and provisions of the TBT Agreement 
going beyond a prohibition on discrimination. In the first piece above, Hudec expressed concern about the 
emergence of a new type of ‘post-discriminatory’ legal standard such as TBT Article 2.2, before discussing the 
smell test as an aspect of how adjudicators respond to accusations of discrimination under the long-standing anti-
discrimination norms. As indicated below (note 9), much depends here on how the sensitive ‘post-discriminatory’ 
provisions are interpreted by the Appellate Body. There are indications that concerns expressed by Hudec and other 
commentators have been internalized.       
7 Panel Report, WT/DS384, 386/R, adopted 23 July 2012 
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justified obstacles [Article 2.2]’.8 Howse similarly expresses the concern that Article 2.4 has the potential 
to turn ‘a mass of normative material that never before had the status of international law into 
international legal obligation’.9 Whether these concerns are realized depends on how these provisions are 
interpreted by panels and the Appellate Body.10 However, the provisions are among those which have the 
potential to expand the WTO from a regime of non-discrimination, into a regime of non-restriction with 
attendant questions about the nature and extent of economic integration envisaged by WTO Members.  
The sensitivity of these obligations does not in itself provide the reason for distinguishing 
between technical regulations and standards. While Articles 2.2 and 2.4 apply only to technical 
regulations, Annex 3 establishes the Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application 
of Standards. Its opening Substantive Provisions (paragraphs D. E. and F.) are closely comparable, 
although not identical, to Articles 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4. The question is then whether the TBT materially 
distinguishes between central government technical regulations and standards either in terms of the 
content of the applicable obligations or the manner of review and enforcement.   
On the content of the applicable obligations, it is notable that paragraph E of the Code does not 
reproduce the whole of Article 2.2. The need to avoid ‘unnecessary obstacles to international trade’ is 
common to both provisions. However, paragraph E goes no further than this. Unlike Article 2.2, it does 
not refer to technical regulations being no ‘more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate 
objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create’. It follows that paragraph E, does not 
offer an indicative list of these legitimate objectives which, in Article 2.2, appears as, ‘national security 
requirements; the prevention of deceptive practices; protection of human health or safety, animal or plant 
life or health, or the environment’. It is doubtful whether this difference should lead to a reduction in the 
rigour of review, or increased deference, for central government standards as opposed to technical 
regulations. The difference can probably be explained by the broad potential coverage of the Annex 3 
Code in that it is open to acceptance by non-governmental standardizing bodies. The list of public policy 
objectives in Article 2.2 are a good fit for bodies which are rooted in the public sphere, but are not always 
                                                          
8 H. Horn and J.H.H. Weiler, ‘European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines: Textualism and its 
Discontent’ in H. Horn and P.C. Mavroidis (eds.) The WTO Case Law of 2002 (2005, American Law Institute) 
available at http://www.ali.org/doc/wto/wto2002/Sardines.pdf visited March 3013 at 6.   
9 R. Howse, Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and International Economic Law, 384 (C. Joerges, 
E.U. Petersmann eds., Hart Publg. 2011). Other commentators are more sanguine even to the extent of arguing that 
Article 2.4 should be strengthened. A. Sykes, above n 2 at 125.  
10 A possible trend in the recent case law under the TBT Agreement is that the Appellate Body has heeded the 
advice of commentators about the sensitive nature of Articles 2.2 and 2.4. It seems to the present author that every 
effort has been made by the Appellate Body to resolve these cases under Article 2.1 (discrimination) rather than 
under Article 2.2 (unnecessary restriction), and that Article 2.4 is being interpreted in a cautious manner. 
Contributions to the literature in light of the new case law have not reiterated the concerns expressed in the main 
text. Indeed, Flett sees TBT Articles 2.1 and 2.2 as recasting, and therefore not going beyond, GATT Articles I, III 
and XX. J. Flett, ‘WTO Space for National Regulation: Requiem for a Diagonal Vector Test’ (2013) 16 Journal of 
International Economic Law 37 at 51 and 59. See also, E. Partiti, ‘The Appellate Body Report in US – Tuna II and 
Its Impact on Eco-Labelling and Standardization’ 40 Legal Issues of Economic Integration (2013) 73. In the related 
context of the SPS Agreement, Rigod considers that ‘requirements such as necessity, risk assessment, and scientific 
evidence are rightly understood as proxies for filtering out ‘protectionist’ policies’. B. Rigod, ‘The Purpose of the 
WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)’ (2013) 24 European Journal of 
International Law 503 at 527.  
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as directly relevant for non-governmental bodies.11 Therefore, the noted textual difference is more 
relevant to a possible differentiation between the review of governmental and non-governmental 
standards, than it is to a possible differentiation between the review of central government technical 
regulations and standards. Panels can at least have the full text of Article 2.2 in mind when reviewing 
central government standards under paragraph E. This is assuming, of course, that compliance with the 
Annex 3 Code can be raised in DSU proceedings.  
The title ‘Code of Good Practice’ indicates that its provisions are not formally enforceable. This 
is reinforced by paragraph Q which refers to ‘sympathetic consideration to, and adequate opportunity for, 
consultation regarding representations with respect to the operation of this Code presented by 
standardizing bodies that have accepted this Code’. The responding standardizing body ‘shall make an 
objective effort to solve any complaints’. Clearly, this is the language of soft law with complaints being 
handled through consultation between standardizing bodies. Left here, the position would be that a 
standard could not be reviewed under the DSU for compliance with the Annex 3 Code.  
However, this position is supplemented by Article 4.1 which requires Members to ‘ensure that 
their central government standardizing bodies accept and comply with’ the Annex 3 Code. This provision 
surely converts the Annex 3 Code into a fully enforceable instrument in respect of central government 
standards. This view is confirmed when the Tokyo Round Standards Code and the proposals which led to 
TBT Annex 3 are considered. Article 2 of the Standards Code was entitled Preparation, adoption and 
application of technical regulations and standards by central government bodies. As such, there was no 
differentiation in the obligations to which the two instruments were subject. In the TBT, Article 2 has the 
same title other than that standards are removed from its scope of coverage. However, the TBT 
Committee proposals which reflect the TBT in its current form indicate that this change was not 
motivated by any desire to dilute the TBT’s application to central government standards. Rather, the 
change was motivated by the desire to strengthen the TBT’s application to non-governmental 
standardizing bodies, while preserving the already strong coverage of central government standards. Of 
                                                          
11 This point is reflected in the manner in which the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) describes 
its work: ‘Public policies are established by governmental authorities and, in a number of cases, ISO standards 
support or relate to such public policy initiatives. ISO, and its sister organization, the International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC), have agreed on four principles to guide the development of such standards. The first principle is 
to provide market-driven international standards, based on objective information and knowledge. The second 
principle is to meet the needs and concerns of all relevant stakeholders, including public authorities where 
appropriate, without seeking to establish, drive or motivate public policy, regulations, or social and political 
agendas. The third principle is recognition that the development of regulation, public policy or the development and 
interpretation of international treaties are the role of governments or treaty organizations. Finally, such ISO and IEC 
standards supporting public policy are best developed within proven structures, operational approaches and 
participation models detailed in ISO/IEC’s existing directives and development procedures.’ International standards 
and “private standards” available at http://www.iso.org/iso/private_standards.pdf last visited September 2013.  
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particular note, in terms of explaining Article 4.1, is the statement in a 1990 proposal that ‘Parties would 
continue to have an obligation to ensure the behaviour of central governmental standardizing bodies’.12     
The TBT therefore adopts an undifferentiated approach towards central government technical 
regulations and standards. This differs from its treatment of technical regulations emanating from central 
government and those emanating from local government bodies and non-governmental bodies. In this 
comparison, the TBT does incorporate a hard law / soft law distinction.13 However, this is on the basis 
that the coverage of WTO obligations generally diminish as we move away from the central government 
level towards regional and local government and still further towards non-governmental bodies. This is 
due to the political organization of states in terms of central government securing the consent of devolved 
government to be bound by international obligations.14 This consideration does not apply when the 
comparison is between different central government instruments. 
The TBT’s text does not therefore offer an explanation for why the US argued that its dolphin 
safe label could not be reviewed as a technical regulation. Conceivably, respondent states may consider 
that voluntary standards are easier to defend, and less likely to breach the applicable rules, than the same 
rules which apply mandatory technical regulations. As voluntary standards permit the existence of 
competing standards, and as products may be marketed without meeting any of these standards, these 
instruments are arguably less likely than mandatory technical regulations to be discriminatory or cause 
unnecessary obstacles to international trade. This idea should be treated with caution. Again, the 
proposals submitted during the Uruguay Round are notable here. In 1988, the EC considered that, 
‘Standards (and Technical regulations) drawn up by non-governmental bodies can, when used on a 
nation-wide basis, in practice create barriers to trade as serious as if they were technical regulations drawn 
up by central government bodies’.15 If non-governmental standards can be just as problematic as central 
government technical regulations, the same observation is surely just as applicable to central government 
technical regulations and standards. In sum, the TBT does not formally differentiate between central 
government technical regulations and standards and there is no reason for panels to have any informal 
differentiation in mind.  
                                                          
12 TBT/W/137, 15 February 1990, Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of 
Standards, Revised Proposal by European Economic Community. Also of relevance here are TBT/W/110, 7 July 
1988 and TBT/W/124, 27 July 1989. 
13 TBT Article 2 sets out the obligations applicable to central government technical regulations in binding terms. It is 
specified that ‘Members shall ensure …’. In contrast, Article 3.1 provides that with respect to technical regulations 
emanating from local government and non-governmental bodies, ‘Members shall take such reasonable measure as 
may be available to them to ensure compliance by such bodies with the provisions of Article 2’. 
14 In the TBT context, this is indicated by the proposals by the European Economic Community in the late 1980’s 
for a Code of Good Practice for Non-Governmental Standardizing Bodies. One of the documents indicates that the 
proposals, ‘…faced the problem that Parties cannot always, legally or factually, “ensure” the behaviour of local 
government bodies and regional bodies’. TBT/W/124, 27 July 1989. 
15 TBT/W/110, 7 July 1988.  Similar comments are a recurring feature of the TBT Triennial Reviews. The most 
recent Review notes that, ‘several Members raised concerns regarding "private standards" and the trade impact 
thereof, while other Members considered that the term lacked clarity and that its relevance to the implementation of 
the TBT Agreement had not been established’.  G/TBT/32, Sixth Triennial Review of the Operation and 
Implementation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade under Article 15.4, para. 7. 
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3. THE CHOICE BETWEEN MANDATORY TECHNICAL REGULATIONS AND VOLUNTARY 
STANDARDS  
This section discusses the considerations which may influence states when choosing between technical 
regulations and standards. It then turns to how these considerations should influence WTO tribunals when 
reviewing these instruments. 
It is uncontroversial to state that all labelling requirements are concerned with consumer 
information. Labels vary however with respect to the importance which is attached to consumers 
receiving the information. If the regulator requires the label to be used in order for the product to be 
marketed, this is because the regulator has attached a high priority to consumers receiving the information 
in a uniform manner. In this situation, a mandatory technical regulation will be preferred. On the other 
hand, a voluntary standard becomes an option as it becomes less important for consumers to receive the 
information in a uniform manner.  
Put differently, the choice between the two instruments can be depicted as depending on the 
balance between two considerations, being the importance of the policy objective at issue, and the extent 
to which this objective can be achieved via co-operation with industry. Two examples can be contrasted 
here. In many states, tobacco products cannot be lawfully marketed without the appropriate labels.16 The 
policy objective of protecting human life and health is of the utmost importance, while the extent to which 
compliance can be left to the voluntary discretion of industry is low. Health warnings do not enhance 
tobacco sales which creates a high degree of information asymmetry between producers and consumers. 
The preference is therefore for mandatory technical regulations. The balance shifts for energy efficiency 
appliance labelling. The environmental objectives here are of a different nature than human health 
concerns, and there is likely to be higher confidence in harnessing industry co-operation. Non-use of the 
voluntary government administered labelling scheme may harm sales so that the information asymmetry 
is not as intense as for tobacco products. Governments are more likely here to perceive that they have the 
option of using voluntary standards especially if a very high industry adoption rate is predicted.  
Of course, states can reach different conclusions on which instrument to use with respect to the 
same subject areas. Energy efficiency labelling is a case in point here.  In the EU, electrical appliances 
such as fridge freezers and washing machines cannot be lawfully marketed without energy efficiency 
labels.17 The same position now applies to the more recently introduced EU labelling scheme which 
require information on the fuel consumption, wet weather grip and external noise level of tyres.18 In 
contrast, the US equivalent of the compulsory EU scheme for appliance labelling is the voluntary 
                                                          
16 In the EU, the relevant instrument is Directive 2001/37/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 
June 2001 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States 
concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco products. 
17 The main instrument here is Directive 2010/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 
on the indication by labelling and standard product information of the consumption of energy and other resources by 
energy-related products. Recital 12 explains the preference for the mandatory nature of the scheme: ‘A completely 
voluntary scheme would lead to only some products being labelled, or supplied with standard product information, 
with the risk that this might result in confusion or even misinformation for some end-users. The present scheme 
should therefore ensure that for all the products concerned, the consumption of energy and other essential resources 
is indicated by labelling and standard product fiches.’ 
18 Regulation (EC) No 1222/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 on the 
labelling of tyres with respect to fuel efficiency and other essential parameters. 
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Environmental Protection Agency Energy Star programme.19 There may well be a difference in regulatory 
philosophy at work here under which the US leaves more to the private sector and the purchasing 
preferences of consumers in terms of achieving the objectives of the voluntary label, whereas the EU 
depends more on compulsion in order to quickly achieve uniformity and minimize consumer confusion.20 
However, the key point for present purposes is that the decision making process resulting in the choice of 
instrument has been informed by entirely legitimate considerations.   
Against this background, the role of WTO tribunals should be to review whether the chosen 
instrument, be it a technical regulation or standard, has been tainted by illegitimate considerations, most 
obviously by protectionist impulses. Naturally, this is achieved by assessing the measure for conformity 
with the TBT’s substantive obligations. As it is possible for WTO tribunals to engage in this exercize for 
both central government technical regulations and standards, it does not matter a great deal how the 
instrument in question is classified. This has implications for the type of test which should be used to 
classify the instrument at issue. A flexible and nuanced test would be essential if something significant 
turned on the classification. If, for example, the review of central government standards was shifted to a 
soft-law regime, panels would need the flexibility to prevent states from avoiding the formal review of 
their measures by qualifying them as voluntary. However, by reason of the TBT’s undifferentiated 
approach, the main priorities for the mandatory compliance test are clarity and predictability as opposed 
to flexibility. This is the main point which informs the further analysis.   
4. LABELLING REQUIREMENTS AND MANDATORY COMPLIANCE IN US-TUNA II  
The meaning of mandatory compliance has been most contentious in cases involving product 
characteristics in the form of labelling requirements. There is an interpretive problem here which came to 
a head in US-Tuna II. The problem arises from the need for interpretation to ‘give meaning and effect to 
all the terms of a treaty’.21 In other words, if the text embodies two terms which appear to be independent 
and cumulative, a distinct meaning must be attributed to each term. There is a strong presumption that the 
treaty drafters neither intended to, nor inadvertently, set out a tautology.  
Evidently, the phrase ‘with which compliance is mandatory’ envisages some kind of binding and 
compulsory character in order for ‘labelling requirements’ to amount to technical regulations. The 
problem is that the phrase ‘labelling requirements’ already suggests a binding and compulsory character. 
                                                          
19 This is described as ‘a voluntary program to identify and promote energy–efficient products and buildings in order 
to reduce energy consumption, improve energy security, and reduce pollution through voluntary labeling of or other 
forms of communication about products and buildings that meet the highest energy efficiency standards’  
http://www.energystar.gov/  
20 The picture is rather different in the context of dolphin safe labelling in that there is only one state administered 
dolphin safe label in the US, whereas a number of labels are used in the EU, none of which are administered by the 
EU institutions. However, this does not really contradict the generally greater preference for compulsory schemes in 
the EU. The need for a state administered dolphin safe programme in the EU is much less than for the US because 
the association between yellow fin tuna and dolphins is observed predominantly in the Eastern Tropical Pacific. This 
tuna is not sold significantly in the EU.      
21 Appellate Body Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, 
adopted 20 May 1996 at p. 23.  
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The agreed definition of this phrase in US-Tuna II was ‘a set of criteria or conditions that must be met 
before a label can be used’.22 Indeed, this is the only meaningful interpretation, both of this phrase, and 
alternative phrases which the draftsmen could have used. If the term ‘requirement’ is interpreted as 
extending to something which is merely preferred or desired as opposed to compulsory, this would permit 
a label to be used even if the criteria for use of the label have not been met. The label would then be 
rendered meaningless23 as it would not convey any consistent and accurate information to consumers. Had 
the draftsmen referred, for example, to ‘labelling parameters’, the parameters of the label would need to 
be ascertained and the label could only be used when these parameters are satisfied.  The essential quality 
of ‘labelling requirements’, and alternative phrases, is therefore that the label may only be used when 
specified criteria have been met. The definition must itself embody a compulsory character, which creates 
the difficulty when interpreting the separate test of whether compliance with the labelling requirement is 
‘mandatory’.   
The need to avoid a tautology in treaty interpretation was clearly identified by the panel 
majority24 and the dissent in US-Tuna II. The passage below from the dissent echoes the panel majority 
concern about the need for distinct meanings for the key terms. It then proposes a solution: 
In order to give any sense to the term ‘labelling requirement’ as used both in Annex 1.1. and 1.2, 
the requirement that compliance is mandatory cannot relate to the obligation to meet certain 
requirements to be allowed to use the label, but to the question whether a labelling scheme is 
compulsory – i.e. whether products must use a label in order to be marketed – or voluntary – i.e. 
products may be marketed with or without the label.25  
As a working hypothesis, it can be suggested that this approach has the benefit of clarity and 
simplicity, and is therefore capable of producing predictable and definite outcomes in individual cases. 
Labelling requirements, whether standards or technical regulations, set out conditions which must be 
adhered to in order to use the label. Labelling requirements mandate compliance, and are therefore 
technical regulations, when use of the label is required in order for the product to gain access to the 
market. On the other hand, if the product can be marketed without the label, the labelling requirement is a 
standard.  
5. TESTING THE CLARITY AND SIMPLICITY HYPOTHESIS 
The test for mandatory compliance in the US-Tuna II dissent enables a tautology to be avoided, but is the 
test as clear and simple as it seems in terms of leading to predictable outcomes on whether a measure is a 
technical regulations or a standard? Some doubt on this question is created by the dissent itself since it 
seems to distinguish the measure in US-Tuna II from that at issue in EC-Sardines. This section explains 
how the measures in these cases did not mandate compliance and were therefore voluntary standards upon 
the proper application of the test in the dissent. As indicated in the introduction, the process of reconciling 
these cases reveals that the test operates independently of the relationship between the measure and the 
market place. This relationship is a relevant consideration when deciding whether the TBT’s substantive 
                                                          
22 Panel Report, US-Tuna II, para. 7.74. 
23 Ibid., para. 7.150. 
24 Ibid., paras. 7.116 – 7.117.  
25 Ibid., para. 7.151. 
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obligations have been breached. Therefore, the identity of the measure as a technical regulation or a 
standard is decided independently of the impressions of adjudicators on the overall merits of the 
complainant’s case. The section explains why this is not a cause for concern.   
a) To what product must the test be applied? 
The first issue is the correct identification of the relevant product. If, in US-Tuna II, the relevant product 
is tuna, then, yes, this product can be marketed without the label, so that compliance is not mandated. 
However, if the relevant product is dolphin safe tuna, this cannot be marketed without the label, so that 
compliance would be mandated. It is clear from the dissent that the test is applied to tuna. Indeed, this is 
the only possible application since, if the relevant product was dolphin safe tuna, the tautology which the 
test seeks to avoid would be reintroduced. The test would effectively be whether compliance with the 
label is required in order to use the label or, in other words, whether there is a labelling requirement. 
While this point might seem self-evident, it is relevant to solving the second issue considered below.   
b) Applying the dissent in EC-Sardines 
The second issue is how the approach in the dissent would have applied in EC-Sardines. The dissent 
preferred to distinguish this case, but arguably did so in an unpersuasive or at least unclear manner. It 
would have been more persuasive had it found the two cases to be indistinguishable (in the sense that both 
involved voluntary standards), and proceeded to find that the EU need not have conceded that its product 
characteristic mandated compliance.26 
The content of the EC regulation at issue in Sardines is identified in the passage from the dissent 
below which also seems to argue that this case and Tuna must be distinguished. 
In EC – Sardines, the mandatory nature of the measures challenged in that case was not in question. 
In that case, the Appellate Body was therefore not called upon to make a determination concerning 
the interaction between mandatory and voluntary requirements. The measures in that case required 
the use of only the species Sardina pilchardus in products marketed as ‘preserved sardines’.  The 
Appellate Body found that “preserved products made, for example, of Sardinops sagax [were], by 
virtue of the EC Regulation, prohibited from being identified and marketed under an appellation 
including the term ‘sardines”’… EC – Sardines did thus not involve a labelling requirement but a 
naming requirement. And by not allowing to market certain preserved sardines as sardines, these 
products were prohibited to enter the sardine market at all. However, in difference to EC – 
Sardines, Mexico is not prohibited from selling its tuna as tuna to the United States. It is a 
fundamental difference between the facts of that case and those of the present dispute that in this 
case the measures lay down labelling requirements, which allow the operator to make claims 
reflecting compliance with a particular standard.27  
                                                          
26 The EU conceded this point on the basis that the product characteristic was contained in a regulation ‘binding in 
its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States’ (Appellate Body Report, EC-Sardines, above n 5, para. 194 
fn 111). 
27 US-Tuna II para. 7.164. 
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This is an opaque passage. It is not clear whether there is any intention to express a view on whether the 
product characteristic at issue in Sardines mandated compliance. The initial impression is that there is no 
such intention. It is noted that the matter was not contested – the EU having conceded this point.  
However, the passage also seems to apply the mandatory compliance test expressed earlier in the 
dissent. The basic test here is whether the product can be marketed without the label. This test is applied 
in the statement that, ‘…by not allowing to market certain preserved sardines as sardines, these products 
were prohibited to enter the sardine market at all’. This is contrasted with Mexico’s position in US-Tuna 
II as ‘not prohibited from selling its tuna as tuna to the United States’. As Mexico’s position resulted in 
the absence of mandatory compliance, the impression is that the dissent viewed EC-Sardines in a different 
light, so that compliance was mandated. The further reference to ‘a fundamental difference between the 
facts’ of the cases reinforces an apparent intention to distinguish the cases in some significant way. To 
clarify, the dissent appeared to contemplate the following distinction: 
- Sardines cannot be marketed as sardines resulting in mandatory compliance 
- Tuna can be marketed as tuna resulting in the absence of mandatory compliance  
 
It is difficult to see how the cases are materially different. The majority in US-Tuna II saw the cases as 
bearing a ‘close resemblance’. In particular, the legal possibility of selling ‘sardinops sagax on the EC 
market, as long as it was not sold under the appellation ‘preserved sardines’’, was noted.28 Thus, 
sardinops sagax not bearing the name ‘sardines’, and tuna products not bearing the dolphin safe label 
could be lawfully sold. This does indeed appear to be a close resemblance. It is true that demand for both 
products might be limited by the product characteristics set out in the measures at issue, but this a further 
commonality between the cases.  
Put differently, the cases are closely analogous when the measures at issue are considered with 
reference to their relationship with the market place and the perceptions of consumers – these being 
indicators of whether the measure was motivated by protectionist impulses.29 According to the dissent, 
Sardines was about not being able to market certain sardines as sardines, whereas, in Tuna, it was 
possible to market tuna as tuna. Neither statement is wrong in isolation from the other, but the statement 
as a whole is arguably a false equivalence. The statement about Sardines is informed by the relationship 
between the measure and the market place, while the statement about Tuna ignores this relationship. If 
this relationship is taken into account, both cases were about not being able to use the commercially 
optimum name or label without complying with the product characteristic. The inability to sell sardines as 
sardines is only significant because other names for the product in question are commercially less 
                                                          
28 Ibid., para. 7.134. 
29 Analysis of the relationship between challenged measures and the market place is an indispensable feature of 
WTO law. In the context of the TBT Agreement, the AB has noted in relation to Article 2.4 that ‘the capacity of a 
measure to accomplish the stated objectives -- its effectiveness -- and the suitability of a measure for the fulfilment 
of the stated objectives -- its appropriateness -- are both decisively influenced by the perceptions and expectations 
of consumers in the European Communities relating to preserved sardine products.’ (Appellate Body Report, EC-
Sardines para. 289) More recently, the Appellate Body noted in relation to TBT Article 2.1 that, ‘...the opportunity 
for a technical regulation to discriminate may well derive from its operation within a given market that exhibits 
particular characteristics’. (WT/DS384, 386/AB/R United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) 
Requirements, adopted 23 July 2012 para. 290).  
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attractive and apt to reduce sale volumes or the sale price.30 If this is accepted, the ability to sell tuna as 
tuna is immaterial to any attempt to distinguish the cases. There is no commercial advantage in being able 
to sell tuna as tuna because of the sharp distinction drawn by consumers between tuna bearing and not 
bearing the dolphin safe label. Indeed, the marketing of tuna as tuna, but without the dolphin safe label, is 
possibly a greater disadvantage than not being able to sell sardines as sardines. This would be the position 
if consumers are more averse to buying tuna without the dolphin safe label, than they are averse to 
purchasing sardinops sagax sold as pilchards or sprats.  
The need, therefore, is to consider both cases from the same angle when comparing them. The 
measures at issue can either be considered in light of, or in isolation from their relationship with the 
market place. The cases are respectively either about not being able to use the commercially optimum 
name or label without complying with the product characteristic, or about the ability to sell the products 
without complying with the product characteristics.  
From which equivalent perspective should both cases be viewed? The answer here is provided by 
referring back to the first point of clarification. The approach in the dissent breaks down and becomes a 
tautology if the measure is viewed in light of its relationship with the market place. If the test is whether 
tuna can be marketed as dolphin safe tuna without complying with the label, the measure would mandate 
compliance by reason of a labelling requirement specifying when tuna can be described as dolphin safe. 
In other words, once it is known that there is a labelling requirement, it also known that compliance is 
mandated. In order to avoid this, the test must be whether tuna can be sold without the dolphin safe label. 
Therefore, in order for the dissent as a whole to be consistent, the measures in US-Tuna II and EC-
Sardines must be viewed in isolation from their relationship with the market place. Both cases were about 
the possibility of selling the products without complying with the product characteristics. In neither case 
was compliance mandated, so that both cases were about voluntary standards under a consistent 
application of the approach in the dissent.  
It is now possible to describe the test in the dissent as flawed. It only succeeds in avoiding the 
tautology if the measure is considered in isolation from its relationship to the market place. To what 
extent should this be of concern? This depends on the importance of the distinction between technical 
regulations and standards as discussed in Section 2. It was argued here that the correct view of the 
relevant TBT provisions is that both instruments can be reviewed under closely comparable provisions 
which are enforceable under the DSU. Therefore, it does not matter if the test for whether a measure is a 
technical regulation operates without considering the relationship between the measure and the market 
                                                          
30 It is not possible to corroborate this claim with reference to the case itself and associated documents, especially 
because Peru’s written submissions are not readily available. However, it is reasonably clear that Peru’s concern was 
that names other than ‘sardines’ such as ‘pilchards’ and ‘sprats’ were less appealing to consumers. This is indicated 
by the following extract from an article based on a telephone interview with an Official of Peru’s delegation in 
Geneva: ‘The Peruvian official described the European position: “It was clear during the consultations that we must 
go forward with our complaint. They offered to use only the scientific name without allowing the use of sardines in 
the label, and they were not moving on this point.” Peruvian exporters said the scientific name was not marketable.’ 
Christina L Davies ‘Do WTO Rules Create a Level Playing Field? Lessons from the Experience of Peru and 
Vietnam’ at16, available at http://www.princeton.edu/~cldavis/files/davis_WTO_and_developing_countries.pdf 
visited on 30 January 2013. Also of anecdotal interest is that landings of pilchards in Cornwall, UK, increased from 
7 tonnes to around 7000 tonnes a year since their re-branding as Cornish Sardines in 1997. 
http://www.cornishsardines.org.uk/historical-background.html visited on 30 January 2013. 
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place. This aspect will feature within the application of the substantive provisions in the Annex 3 Code of 
Good Practice.31 This review can occur in the context of proceedings under the DSU.  
The discussion now turns to the concept of de facto mandatory compliance.  
6. DE FACTO MANDATORY COMPLIANCE 
There has been some speculation in the literature on the concept of de facto mandatory compliance.32 
Significant guidance has now been provided by the dissent in US-Tuna II and the panel in United States – 
Certain Country of Origin Labelling Requirements (US-COOL).33 The appraisal of this guidance is 
informed by the view that the TBT does not differentiate between central government technical 
regulations and standards. Under this position, an overly broad understanding of the concept could curtail 
the legitimate scope for states to choose between technical regulations and standards. Indeed, when the 
proper test is understood, it becomes clear that a finding of de facto mandatory compliance will be rare - 
more so than a finding of de facto discrimination. 
The test was formulated in the US-Tuna II panel dissent as ‘whether, despite the absence of a de 
jure requirement in the measures at issue to use the “dolphin-safe” label in order to market tuna products 
in the United States, tuna products are nonetheless compelled to carry that label as a result of some other 
action attributable to the United States’.34 This was then recast as a two-fold enquiry: ‘First, the 
impossibility of marketing tuna products in the United States without the “dolphin-safe” label must be 
established. Second, such impossibility must arise from facts sufficiently connected to the US dolphin-
safe provisions or to another governmental action of the United States.’35 A helpful example of de facto 
mandatory compliance was also provided: ‘It would be conceivable, for example, that if a Member in fact 
grants certification in relation to one particular standard as a means of complying with a regulatory 
requirement, but not in relation to other standards, its actions may turn that formally voluntary standard, 
into a de facto technical regulation.’36  
These passages clarify that the same high threshold applies to both de jure and de facto 
mandatory compliance. It must be shown that it is not possible to market the product without the label. 
                                                          
31 In other words, the Appellate Body statements in n 29 above on the operation of the obligations which apply to 
technical regulations are equally applicable to the equivalent obligations which apply to standards under the Annex 
3 Code of Good Practice. 
32 The following extract is effectively about the circumstances in which de facto mandatory compliance should be 
recognized: ‘It seems relatively clear that whenever a government refers to a private voluntary specification partly or 
fully into its legislation, the specification loses it nature as a (voluntary) standard and turns into a (mandatory) 
technical regulation. Far more complicated are instances in which technical specification appear prima facie to be 
voluntary, but the government exercises a certain degree of pressure to ensure conformity with its terms. In future 
cases, the real question will then be what degree of governmental pressure for the implementation of a standard is 
necessary to transform a standard into a technical regulation.’ Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, Anja Seibert-
Fohr (eds.) Technical Barriers and SPS Measures, Max Plank Institute for Comparative Public Law and 
International Law, Martinus Nikhoff Publishers (2007) Leiden, The Netherlands at 190. 
33 WT/DS384,386/R, adopted 23 July 2012. 
34 Panel Report, US-Tuna II, para. 7.174. 
35 Ibid., para. 7.175. 
36 Ibid., note 333. 
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This is a crucial point. There is a danger of relaxing the test for de facto mandatory compliance to whether 
the measure creates a barrier to trade or segments the market even though it is formally voluntary. This 
shift would result in a different and lower threshold for de facto mandatory compliance, when the only 
matter that should change is the source and nature of the evidence adduced in order to establish the 
impossibility of marketing without compliance. Mandatory compliance is established de jure based on an 
explicit requirement to use the label in the measure itself. The de facto impossibility of marketing without 
the label can be established with reference to any evidence,37 provided there is a sufficient connection to 
governmental action. In the example provided, this connection is clear. The certification procedure is 
plainly attributable to the government and results in the factual impossibility of marketing without 
meeting a formally voluntary standard.    
A different source of evidence is provided by considering the relationship between the measure 
and the market place. Mexico argued that the labelling requirement was de facto mandatory because US 
market conditions were such as to make it ‘impossible to effectively market and sell tuna products 
without a dolphin-safe designation’.38 This argument raises two issues. The first is whether the private 
conduct of avoiding the whole-sale and retail purchase of tuna not bearing the label can be sufficiently 
connected to a government measure or action. The second question is whether Mexico’s argument is an 
impermissible reformulation of the test for mandatory compliance. There is a difference between the 
impossibility of marketing a product, and the impossibility of effectively marketing a product - the latter 
being a lower threshold. 
On the first question, the starting point is that purely private conduct cannot be attributed to 
governments in WTO proceedings. However, there is substantial scope for establishing a connection 
between private conduct and a government measure or action.39 Despite this scope, the dissent did not 
detect a sufficient connection between the limited market opportunities for unlabelled tuna, and the US 
dolphin safe measure. It was noted that the major processors of tuna had ‘adopted as their own 
commercial policies not to use tuna that had been obtained by setting on dolphins’.40 These policies were 
‘prompted by the lobbying exerted by environmentalists rather than the enactment of the DPCIA itself.’ 
There was also evidence that a ‘nationwide boycott of tuna supported by schoolchildren, celebrities and 
business leaders was due to a “dolphin campaign video”’.41 In sum, the dissent seemed to consider that 
the limited market opportunities for tuna caught by setting on dolphins was explained by purely private 
conduct.  
                                                          
37 I am inclined to agree with Flett’s view here even though he is not writing in the specific context of de facto 
mandatory compliance: ‘…in a de facto case there are no facts that are per se excluded from the analysis. That is the 
whole point of a de facto case. It is up to the litigants to persuade the adjudicator of their relevance.’ J. Flett, ‘WTO 
Space for National Regulation: Requiem for a Diagonal Vector Test’ 16(1) Journal of International Economic Law 
(2013) 37 at 49. 
38  Panel Report, US-Tuna II, para. 7.166. 
39 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh Chilled and Frozen Beef, 
WT/DS161/AB/R, adopted 10 January 2001, para. 146.  
 
40 Panel Report, US-Tuna II, para. 7.180. 
41 Ibid., para. 7.182. 
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For the Appellate Body, however, there was a sufficient connection between the measure and the 
depressed commercial opportunities. It should be pointed out that the Appellate Body did not consider 
this matter in connection with the possibility of de facto mandatory compliance, but in connection with 
the alleged Article 2.1 violation. However, as part of its Article 2.1 analysis, the Appellate Body 
considered ‘whether any detrimental impact on Mexican tuna products results from the measure itself 
rather than from the actions of private parties’.42 This is a comparable question as that considered in the 
dissent in connection with mandatory compliance. The Appellate Body noted that ‘the measure at issue 
establishes the requirements under which a product can be labelled “dolphin-safe” in the United States’. It 
agreed with the panel that any advantage brought about by access to the label ‘is provided by the 
measures themselves’.43 This conclusion was not disturbed by the presence of ‘some element of private 
choice’. The position may now be that a sufficient connection is established between a government 
measure and private conduct when the measure reflects, responds to and reinforces this conduct.  
In response to this apparent difference of approach, there is little need to decide whether the 
Appellate Body adopted an overly expansive view of when private conduct can be sufficiently linked to a 
government measure, or whether the dissent adopted an overly restrictive view. In the Article 2.1 
analysis, this is just the initial threshold matter with the decisive next step being whether any detrimental 
impact reflects discrimination. Similarly, when looking at the two stage test for de facto mandatory 
compliance, the second stage is more important than deciding on the connection between private conduct 
and government regulation. Even if this connection is present, the exact test for de facto mandatory 
compliance must be decided upon. 
As noted, Mexico called for this test to be relaxed relative to the test for de jure mandatory 
compliance. The dissent dismissed this suggestion: 
To the extent that Mexico’s argument is based on an impossibility of “effectively” marketing and 
selling tuna products without a dolphin-safe designation, this would not, in my view, provide a 
sufficient basis for a determination that compliance with the US dolphin-safe labelling 
requirements is “mandatory” within the meaning of Annex 1.1. Compliance with a voluntary 
technical document such as a standard may substantially increase the chances of a product being 
effectively sold in a given market. Conversely, failure to comply with such standard may have 
negative consequences for the competitiveness of a product in that market. However, this fact alone 
would not alter the voluntary or “not mandatory” nature of that standard, within the meaning of the 
TBT Agreement.44  
The idea here is that the ability to effectively market a product may be significantly impeded by the 
decision not to conform with a voluntary standard.  Therefore, to find that such an impediment amounts to 
de facto mandatory compliance blurs the boundary between technical regulations and standards and limits 
the ability of states to choose between these instruments. This ability to choose, and its implications for 
the reach of de facto mandatory compliance, can be further explored with reference to US-COOL. 
                                                          
42 Appellate Body Report, US-Tuna II, para. 236. 
43 Ibid., para. 237 
44 Panel Report, US-Tuna II, para. 7.177. 
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The country of origin labelling requirements for certain meat products were set out in statutory 
provisions and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture. It was not contested that these 
aspects of the scheme mandated compliance. Also at issue, however, was a letter sent to industry 
representatives by Secretary of Agriculture, Thomas J. Vilsack. This letter suggested that industry should 
voluntarily adopt a number of practices in addition to, and more onerous than those required by the 
statutory and regulatory scheme. For example, it was suggested that producers should voluntarily provide 
information on what production steps occurred in each country when (as per the statute and regulations) 
multiple countries appear on the label. Like the US-Tuna II panel dissent, the US-COOL panel recognized 
the possibility of a measure mandating compliance on a de facto basis,45 but went on to find that the 
Vilsack letter did not mandate compliance. This was mainly because the limited evidence failed ‘…to 
demonstrate industry’s actual compliance’ with the letter.46  
It can be questioned whether the evidence would ever demonstrate de facto mandatory 
compliance, at least based on the test in the Tuna dissent. It would be necessary to demonstrate the 
impossibility of marketing without the additional information envisaged in the Vilsack letter. It is difficult 
to envisage a sufficiently high level of compliance to satisfy this test. After all, no lawful enforcement 
action could be brought against firms choosing not to provide the additional information. Even supposing 
that industry had overwhelmingly changed its practices in order to meet the Vilsack recommendations, it 
is submitted that the panel ought to have been extremely cautious about finding de facto mandatory 
compliance. This view can be explained with reference to this passage: 
Adopting a formalistic interpretation of the phrase ‘with which compliance is mandatory’ would 
allow Members to escape the coverage of large portions of the TBT Agreement merely by 
qualifying their own measures as non-mandatory, or compliance with such measures as voluntary. 
This would strip Annex 1.1 and ultimately large portions of the TBT Agreement of their effet 
utile.47 
This passage arguably depicts in a pejorative light the choices which governments can legitimately make 
between regulating via technical regulations and via standards. It is submitted that this choice is unlikely 
to be directly or significantly influenced be the possibility of avoiding the review of measures as technical 
regulations. As suggested in Section 3, the choice is more likely to depend on the balance between two 
considerations being the importance of the policy objective at issue, and the extent to which this objective 
can be achieved via co-operation with industry. Applied to health warnings on tobacco products, the 
preference is generally for enforceable mandatory measures and the prospect of review as technical 
regulations at the WTO is unlikely to give much cause for hesitation. In other words, it is implausible that 
the decision makers here would have considered the possibility of a formally voluntary scheme, coupled 
with written or unwritten mechanisms to create pressure towards compliance,  in order to ‘escape the 
coverage of large portions of the TBT Agreement’. There is too much at stake in terms of protecting 
public health, and the decision makers would be confident of defending the mandatory technical 
regulation in the event of a legal challenge. In contrast, governments are more likely, for energy 
efficiency appliance labelling, to perceive that they have the option of using voluntary standards 
especially if a very high industry adoption rate is predicted. Indeed, government incentives towards 
                                                          
45 Panel Report, US-COOL, para. 7.176. 
46  Ibid., para. 7.188 
47 Ibid., para. 7.175. 
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compliance might be an observable feature of such schemes, but it difficult to see how any such incentive 
or pressure could compel compliance such as to render a formally voluntary scheme de facto mandatory. 
The fact that a resulting standard cannot be reviewed as a technical regulation is an incidental by-product 
of a legitimate decision making process. 
  Nevertheless, WTO tribunals must have scope to review whether the preferred instrument has 
been influenced by protectionist motivations. The test for de facto mandatory compliance in the dissent is 
really an echo of the standard test. The impossibility of marketing without the label must be established. 
As such, it is not enough if the measure severely limits the possibility of selling tuna without the label. 
The measure will still be a standard despite this initial positive indicator of protectionism. This does not 
matter provided this indicator, and others, can be explored under the TBT’s substantive obligations in 
DSU proceedings. The central argument of this article is that this is possible by reason of the TBT’s 
undifferentiated approach towards central government technical regulations and standards.  
7. MANDATORY COMPLIANCE ACCORDING TO THE US-TUNA II PANEL MAJORITY AND 
THE APPELLATE BODY 
The interpretation of mandatory compliance preferred by the panel and upheld by the Appellate Body 
consists of three inter-dependent elements which can be termed provenance, exclusivity and 
enforceability, with no clear identification of any weighting, if any, applied to the different elements. In 
other words, this is a ‘case by case’ approach in which adjudicators appear to retain discretion on the 
significance attached to the presence of one element, or the absence of another.  
In US-Tuna II itself, all the elements considered were satisfied leading to the conclusion that 
compliance was mandated. However, a mere statement of the elements and how they were satisfied 
provides only a deficient understanding of when labelling requirements are technical regulations. A fuller 
understanding is gained by asking how, if at all, the determination would have differed if one or more of 
the elements had not been satisfied. Are some of the elements in fact necessary conditions for mandatory 
compliance even though not presented by the Appellate Body as such? Alternatively, could just one of the 
elements operate on its own as the test for mandatory compliance? Through these questions, it is possible 
to express a view on how the test for mandatory compliance will develop in future cases, or what it might 
be reduced to.   
a) Provenance  
On provenance, it was noted that it may be appropriate to consider ‘whether the measure consists of a law 
or regulation enacted by a WTO Member’.48 Upon application, it was noted that ‘the Dolphin Protection 
Consumer Information Act and the implementing regulations constitute legislative or regulatory acts of 
the US federal authorities’.49 This cautious formulation raises the question of whether an instrument 
which is not a government measure of any description can mandate compliance. The answer to this 
question is indicated by the title of TBT Article 3, Preparation, Adoption and Application of Technical 
Regulations by Local Government Bodies and Non-Governmental Bodies. This title arguably indicates 
than an instrument of a non-governmental body can be a technical regulation which mandates 
compliance. It is submitted, however, that this is incorrect. The intention was probably to signal that non-
                                                          
48 Appellate Body Report, US-Tuna II, para. 188. 
49 Ibid., para. 191. 
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governmental bodies can be involved in the preparation and perhaps application of technical regulations, 
without having any capacity to adopt such instruments; this function being the exclusive preserve of 
government bodies. On this basis, instruments of non-governmental bodies can only be voluntary 
standards other than to the extent that they are adopted by government bodies as mandatory technical 
regulations.  
b) Exclusivity 
The exclusivity criterion was described as ‘whether it [the law or regulation] sets out specific 
requirements that constitute the sole means of addressing a particular matter’.50 If the view on provenance 
expressed above is accepted, it would not be possible to apply the exclusivity criterion to an instrument of 
a non-governmental body with a view to determining whether this instrument mandates compliance. 
Therefore, even if a non-governmental instrument is the only means of addressing a particular matter, the 
point is that this instrument is already disqualified from mandating compliance and from being a technical 
regulation. This disqualification is not redeemed through exclusivity. If this is not accepted, the further 
argument is that a non-governmental instrument cannot be exclusive in the relevant sense. Even if such an 
instrument is the sole means of addressing a matter at a particular point in time, this is subject to the 
possible future adoption of a government measure which would take priority.   
Upon application in US-Tuna II, it was found that the measure ‘establishes a single and legally 
mandated set of requirements for making any statement with respect to the broad subject of “dolphin-
safety” of tuna products in the United States’.51 How does test for mandatory compliance as exclusivity 
fare when subjected to the same critique as the simple and clear test in the dissent? 
As with the test in the dissent, the exclusivity criterion avoids the tautology between ‘labelling 
requirements’ and mandatory compliance. This can be illustrated by changing the facts of US-Tuna II and 
supposing that the measure had been in the form of a preference for the use of a particular dolphin safe 
label and permitted the use of other dolphin safe labels. This measure would still establish a labelling 
requirement by setting out conditions to be fulfilled in order to use the preferred label. However, it would 
not any more mandate compliance because of its non-exclusive nature through the permissibility of other 
dolphin safe labels. Voluntary labelling schemes along these lines emanating from legislative measures 
are not just hypothetical possibilities with the US Energy Star programme and EU Ecolabel being 
examples.52     
Could ‘exclusivity’ operate on its own as the test for mandatory compliance? This would be 
problematic because TBT Article 2.7 envisages the possibility of technical regulations which eventually 
become non-exclusive. This provision requires Members to ‘…give positive consideration to accepting as 
equivalent technical regulations of other Members, even if these regulations differ from their own, 
                                                          
50 Ibid., para. 188. 
51 Ibid., para. 193. 
52 The Energy Star web-site describes this initiative as ‘a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) voluntary 
program that helps businesses and individuals save money and protect our climate through superior energy 
efficiency’.  It was ‘established by EPA in 1992, under the authority of the Clean Air Act Section 103(g)’.              
http://www.energystar.gov/ (last visited June 2013). The EU initiative is under Regulation (EC) No 66/2010 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 on the EU Ecolabel. 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ecolabel/ (last visited June 2013). 
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provided they are satisfied that these regulations adequately fulfil the objectives of their own regulations’. 
Therefore, a labelling requirement can be a technical regulation, even if other labelling requirements, 
which are also technical regulations, are recognized as valid. A distinction can however be drawn to 
preserve exclusivity as a useful criterion indicative of mandatory compliance. There are labelling 
requirements such as the EU Ecolabel which, from the outset, permit the use of alternative labels relating 
to the same type of information as that covered by the Ecolabel. Such labelling schemes have a strongly 
non-exclusive character independently of Article 2.7 and are therefore standards. In contrast, there are 
labelling requirements such as the measure at issue in US-Tuna II, which from the outset have a strongly 
exclusive character. When exclusivity is the very essence of the measure, this quality is arguably not lost 
by reason of the soft obligation to give positive consideration to mutual recognition. Even if the technical 
regulations of other states are accepted as equivalent, the labelling requirement remains essentially 
exclusive in character subject to recognized extensions. In other words, it would be an exaggeration to 
claim that Article 2.7 renders meaningless the concept of an exclusive labelling requirement. 
Nevertheless, this is enough of a wrinkle to prevent mandatory compliance from being equated solely 
with exclusivity. It should continue as an indicative criterion.     
c) Enforceability  
The Appellate Body’s third criterion for mandatory compliance was enforceability. It initially gave the 
impression that it would not attribute much weight to this criterion, noting that both technical regulations 
and standards ‘could be “compulsory” or “binding” and “enforceable”’. It followed that ‘such 
characteristics, taken alone [could not] therefore be dispositive of the proper legal characterization of the 
measure’ and it was necessary to consider the ‘additional characteristics’ which I have termed provenance 
and exclusivity.53  
The required clarification relates to the sense in which all labelling requirements are capable of 
being enforced. Regardless of provenance, an instrument which sets out criteria or conditions to be 
fulfilled in order to use a label will usually be enforceable via general laws against deceptive practices. 
Hence, as the Appellate Body states, the possibility of enforcement cannot be dispositive of whether the 
instrument is a technical regulation or a standard. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw distinctions based 
on the nature and extent of the enforcement. At one end of the spectrum, there are labelling requirements 
which are merely enforceable via general laws against deceptive practices. In contrast, the Appellate 
Body seemed to locate the measure in US-Tuna II at the opposite end of the spectrum. It noted that ‘the 
US measure provides for specific enforcement mechanisms’ setting out ‘active surveillance mechanisms 
to guarantee compliance with its norms and … sanctions in case of wrongful labelling’.54 This level of 
enforcement operated independently of any general laws against deceptive practices.  
There is much to commend enforceability as an indicative criterion for mandatory compliance. 
First, enforceability can be closely linked to the ordinary meaning of the phrase ‘with which compliance 
is mandated’. This phrase invites enquiry into the extent to which the measure itself mandates 
compliance. This seems to have been recognized by the Appellate Body when it observed in EC – 
Asbestos that ‘compliance with the prohibition against products containing asbestos is mandatory and is, 
                                                          
53 Appellate Body Report, US-Tuna II, para.188 
54 Ibid., para. 194. 
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indeed, enforceable through criminal sanctions’ referred to in the measure itself.55 Secondly, the idea of a 
continuum of enforceability enables the tautology to be avoided. Labelling requirements are not 
automatically technical regulations because they are capable of being enforced through general laws 
against deceptive practices. Thirdly, the decision on how much more by way of enforcement is required to 
indicate mandatory compliance obviously involves the exercize of discretion and therefore provides some 
flexibility and room for maneuver when deciding on the identity of the instrument.56 Fourthly, 
enforceability works well as an indicative criterion in tandem with exclusivity. These criteria are 
connected in the sense that, as the level of enforceability increases, so does the likelihood that the 
measure sets out the sole means for addressing a particular matter. High levels of investment in 
enforcement may reflect a preference for a particular label to the exclusion of others.  
As noted, these advantages relate to enforceability as an indicative criterion. It would potentially 
produce the wrong result in at least two situations if used as the sole criterion. Suppose that the labelling 
requirement is non-exclusive in the sense that a number of different labels can permissibly be used to 
convey much the same information. Suppose further that this labelling requirement is highly enforceable 
in the sense that unauthorized use of the label is subject to the kinds of enforcement mechanisms seen in 
US-Tuna II. The first element here is indicative of a standard, whereas the second indicates a technical 
regulation. It would be wrong to categorize this measure based on the extent of enforcement alone, albeit 
that this consideration should probably bear more weight than the measure’s non-exclusive character. As 
a second example, suppose that, in Tuna, enforcement had been left to general laws against deceptive 
practices, and suppose further that the marketing of tuna products without the dolphin safe label was 
prohibited. This measure is essentially a mandatory technical regulation by reason of the prohibition on 
marketing without the label. The low level of enforcement should not affect this position.  
8. CONCLUSION 
What is at stake when adjudicators need to decide whether the instrument before them is a central 
government technical regulation which mandates compliance, or a central government voluntary 
standard? Very probably, the correct answer is not very much. Technical regulations can undoubtedly be 
reviewed for conformity with the substantive obligations in Article 2, while the Annex 3 Code subjects 
voluntary standards to the same obligations. When standards emanate from central government bodies, 
the Annex 3 Code obligations are hard law by reason of TBT Article 4.1. This requires Members to 
‘ensure that their central government standardizing bodies accept and comply with’ the Annex 3 Code. In 
sum, central government technical regulations and standards are subject to parallel sets of obligations 
which do not materially differ in content, and which are enforceable in DSU proceedings.  
 Under this understanding, should the panel dissent in US-Tuna II be preferred over the panel 
majority and Appellate Body on the issue of how the instruments should be distinguished? Both 
interpretations of mandatory compliance allow a tautology between this treaty term and ‘labelling 
requirements’ to be avoided. This is a shared advantage. The main distinguishing feature is that the test in 
the dissent lacks any discretionary elements, whereas the Appellate Body’s tests provide room for 
                                                          
55 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos Containing 
Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, para. 72. 
56 Whether this is a context in which flexibility is desirable or useful is considered in the Conclusion. 
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maneuver. Under the dissent, it is either possible to market the product without complying with the 
labelling requirement, or it is not. In contrast, the extent to which misuse of the label is monitored and 
enforced, as an indicator of mandatory compliance, provides some flexibility. Of course, flexibility 
sometimes comes at the expense of uncertainty. This was not the position in US-Tuna II. The three 
elements of the Appellate Body’s test for mandatory compliance were clearly satisfied. However, the 
outcome of future cases might not be so easy to predict. Therefore, the question is whether this is an area 
in which flexibility is useful, or whether the more straightforward test in the dissent suffices. Flexibility 
would be essential if the TBT materially distinguished between central government technical regulations 
and standards. It would protect the possibility of reviewing the measure as a technical regulation in DSU 
proceedings when adjudicators form the impression that protectionist motivations have been at work. As 
noted however, the better view is that the TBT does not incorporate a hard law / soft law distinction for 
these instruments. Therefore protectionist motivations can be explored in DSU proceedings through the 
proxy of the TBT’s substantive obligations for both instruments. The flexibility in the Appellate Body’s 
interpretation of mandatory compliance does not have a strong role to play. As such, the clear, simple and 
certain test in the dissent can be preferred. 
  
 
